An expert Q&A with Caleb Weiss

Interview and analysis by Mustafa Osman
Balqiis Insights

Somalia’s armed groups draw on financial and procurement networks whose reach exceeds their territorial presence. Puntland’s Operation Hilaac, launched in late 2024 against the Islamic State in Somalia (IS-Somalia) in the Cal Miskaad mountains of Bari region, disrupted one such network. In July 2025, UN monitors reported that the Al-Karrar office, the Somalia-based office coordinating and financing Islamic State affiliates, had lost revenue and interrupted transfers to regional branches. The report also identified Al-Karrar as a funding source for Islamic State Khorasan Province. [1, 6]

To examine these issues, Balqiis Insights spoke with Caleb Weiss, an editor of FDD’s Long War Journal and a senior analyst at the Bridgeway Foundation. The interview considers IS-Somalia’s external networks following the Puntland offensive, the conditions under which conflict in Ethiopia could benefit militant groups, and the evidence concerning cooperation between armed organisations in Somalia and Yemen. [4]

The 2026 reports show that financial disruption persisted alongside local resilience. In February, UN monitors described reduced revenue collection but continued access to business income and reserves. In August, they reported that IS-Somalia remained unable to fund other affiliates, while collecting limited revenue through extortion in Bosaso and Qandala. They also recorded temporary returns to cleared positions when security operations slowed in January. The July 2025 report therefore documents the initial disruption; the later reports qualify what that disruption achieved. [7, 8]

The Somalia–Yemen connection operates through both arms brokerage and relations between militant organisations. The US Treasury’s November 2022 designations identified suppliers serving IS-Somalia and Al-Shabaab, alongside facilitators with links to Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). This evidence points to a procurement market capable of supplying rival groups. It does not establish coordination between those buyers, but it helps explain why pressure on one organisation may leave suppliers and intermediaries available to others. [2]

Subsequent UN reporting describes exchanges beyond commercial procurement. The July 2025 Monitoring Team report identified financial support from Al-Shabaab to Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), with training and weapons supplied in return. It also reported weapons exchanges and training involving the Houthis and Al-Shabaab. The Yemen Panel of Experts later described instruction in explosives manufacture, drone adaptation and weapons maintenance. In February 2026, the Monitoring Team characterised Houthi–Al-Shabaab collaboration as limited and transactional; its August report said relations continued. These assessments draw on Member State information and, in the Yemen Panel’s account, official and confidential sources. The underlying evidence is not all publicly available. Evidence of a relationship or training does not, by itself, establish the delivery and battlefield use of a particular advanced system. [1, 3, 7, 8]

Ethiopia’s relevance rests on its exposure to cross-border militancy and competing demands on its forces. Al-Shabaab’s July 2022 incursion followed attacks on Aato and Yeed in Bakool and developed into fighting inside Ethiopia. That operation demonstrated an ambition to establish a presence beyond Somalia. [5] Renewed fighting in Tigray since September 2026, followed by Ethiopian troops reaching Zalambessa, a town on Ethiopia’s border with Eritrea in October, has made the risk of wider conflict immediate. Ethiopia also maintains forces in Somalia under AUSSOM and bilateral arrangements. AUSSOM’s September rotation in Beletweyne and Halgan confirmed continued deployments; a rotation should not be treated as evidence of a net withdrawal. [9–11]

Weiss identifies different potential gains for Al-Shabaab and IS-Somalia from an expanded Ethiopian conflict. For Al-Shabaab, the more immediate opportunity would arise if Ethiopian redeployments reduced pressure on its positions in Somalia or weakened security along the frontier. For IS-Somalia, his assessment centres on transit, recruitment and access to supplies. These mechanisms should not be conflated. A troop withdrawal could alter a local military balance without materially improving IS-Somalia’s logistics; disruption along a transit corridor could benefit facilitators without producing a territorial opening for Al-Shabaab. The relevant variables are therefore the location of the fighting, the units diverted, the routes affected and the capacity of remaining forces to maintain control.

This interview was conducted in writing on [interview date to be confirmed]. The questions and answers are reproduced as provided, with a clarification approved by Caleb Weiss. The introduction, conclusion and editor’s notes are separate from Caleb Weiss’s responses. Context and sources updated on 15 October 2026.

How should analysts understand the relationship between the security crises in Somalia, Ethiopia and Yemen? Which connections are supported by evidence, and which remain plausible but unverified?

Caleb Weiss:

Analysts should understand that the various conflicts are intertwined in various ways. For instance, both al-Shabaab (AS) and IS-Somalia have ties to armed groups in Yemen. AS has attempted on many occasions to establish some sort of presence in Ethiopia – an expanded conflict there would only make that easier. IS-Somalia has long used Ethiopia as a transit and logistical hub with Ethiopians being one of the largest foreign components of the group. Ties between AS and AQAP in Yemen, for instance, seem to be supported by evidence, as are ties between AS, IS-Somalia, and the same Yemeni and Somali arms dealers. I personally think the Houthi-AS connection needs more verification on specifics, but it is certainly plausible and not out of the realm of possibility.

What operational, financial or logistical links currently exist between IS-Somalia and Islamic State networks outside Somalia, particularly in Yemen and the wider Middle East?

Caleb Weiss:

IS-Somalia has (or had) extensive ties within the Yemeni arms market and likely continues to have some sort of relationship with IS in Yemen. At the height of IS-Somalia (2021-2024), it was also sending lots of money to IS-Yemen, IS in Turkey, and IS Khorasan Province (and likely to Syria, but not sure that has been conclusively proven). Now, since the Puntland offensive against it, my understanding is that it now struggles to maintain the same level of operational capacity it once had in terms of regional and international networks. The UN has also confirmed as much.

Could an escalation of conflict in Ethiopia benefit IS-Somalia? Could it increase weapons availability, open new smuggling routes, facilitate recruitment or reduce Ethiopian military pressure on militant groups operating in Somalia?

Caleb Weiss:

I’m not sure a contained conflict in Tigray would be of much substantive assistance to IS-Somalia, but an expanded conflict in Ethiopia, in which many regions are embroiled, would likely make it easier for IS-Somalia to continue to use Ethiopia as a transit and logistical hub, and likely make it easier to procure weapons and supplies in a growing black market as arms freely flow across the various conflicts. It could also mean more potential recruitment avenues – with Ethiopians being one of the largest foreign components of IS Somalia already. All of this is the same argument for AS, for what it’s worth. It also stands to benefit greatly from an expanded Ethiopian conflict, including a greater chance to formally establish itself in the Ogaden. And naturally, if more Ethiopian troops are redeployed away from their positions in Somalia, this of course gives more breathing room for AS to operate and consolidate even more gains.

How has the Yemen conflict changed the regional market for weapons, drones and military technology? Is there credible evidence that armed groups in Somalia are gaining access to systems, components or expertise originating from Yemen?

Caleb Weiss:

There is a lot of talk and reports on this obviously, though a lot of the sourcing appears to be anonymous officials from various governments. So I think more needs to be done on this front to definitively confirm, especially as some of the stuff that the Houthis have reportedly transferred to AS (advanced drones, missiles, etc) hasn’t been seen on the battlefield. But maybe AS is just waiting for the right opportunity. But the idea that the Houthis and AS would have a relationship is not that surprising. The Houthis and AQAP, AS’ brothers in al-Qaeda, have a deepening relationship too.

Do IS-Somalia, Al-Shabaab, Islamic State networks in Yemen, the Houthis and regional trafficking groups cooperate, compete or simply use overlapping smuggling infrastructure? What evidence is needed to distinguish direct coordination from transactional contact?

Caleb Weiss:

For IS-Somalia and AS it is more using overlapping networks and infrastructure. For AS and the Houthis, there is possibly something there regarding actual cooperation. IS Somalia and IS Yemen cooperate and IS Somalia once supported the latter. AS and AQAP have a deep relationship. There is also evidence that all these groups also benefited from the same Iran-linked arms network as documented by several independent researchers. As for evidence, particularly for the assertions that the Houthis have transferred advanced weaponry to AS, the use of these said advance weapons on the battlefield would obviously be the greatest evidence.

Editor’s note: Weiss confirmed that his reference is to research by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC). Relevant research includes its 2021 study tracing rifles found in Somalia to likely Iran–Yemen supply chains. That study supports the existence of overlapping trafficking routes, but does not establish that every organisation named in the question received weapons from a single network. [12]

The interview points to distinct problems for Somali security policy: disrupting external financing, preventing procurement networks from replenishing militant capacity, and preparing for local security gaps if neighbouring states redeploy forces. Each requires evidence at a different level. Battlefield gains need to be assessed alongside changes in financial flows and access to suppliers; reported weapons transfers need to be examined for their operational consequences. A regional perspective is useful to the extent that it identifies which connections sustain each organisation and where those connections can be disrupted. For the AUSSOM transition, Somali authorities and partners need to identify which forces will hold each position before any Ethiopian drawdown, including bilateral deployments, so that a change in troop numbers does not leave an unfilled security responsibility.

About Caleb Weiss

Caleb Weiss is an editor at FDD’s Long War Journal and a senior analyst at the Bridgeway Foundation. His research at Bridgeway examines Islamic State expansion in Central Africa. His published reporting also covers IS-Somalia, Al-Shabaab and counterterrorism operations in Somalia. [4]

Sources

1. United Nations, S/2025/482, 24 July 2025: paragraph 41 (Houthi–Al-Shabaab weapons and training); paragraph 74 (Al-Shabaab support to AQAP and reciprocal weapons/training); paragraphs 104–105 (Al-Karrar disruption and IS-Khorasan funding).
https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?l=en&s=S/2025/482&t=pdf

2. U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Terrorist Weapons Trafficking Network in Eastern Africa,” 1 November 2022.
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1066

3. United Nations Panel of Experts on Yemen, S/2025/650, 17 October 2025, paragraphs 78–79.
https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?l=en&s=S/2025/650&t=pdf

4. FDD’s Long War Journal, Caleb Weiss author biography.
https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/author/caleb-weiss

5. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2022, Somalia chapter, “2022 Terrorist Incidents.” Official archive.
https://2021-2025.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2022/somalia/

6. Mustafa Osman, “IS-Somalia’s Return to Cal Miskaad: Is the Year-Long Campaign at Risk?”, Balqiis Insights, 1 June 2026. https://balqiis.org/is-somalias-return-to-cal-miskaad-is-the-year-long-campaign-at-risk/

7. United Nations, S/2026/44, 4 February 2026, paragraphs 35–37 (IS-Somalia resilience and finances) and 40 (AQAP and Houthi relations).
https://docs.un.org/en/S/2026/44

8. United Nations, S/2026/651, 10 August 2026, paragraphs 41–44 (leadership, temporary territorial return, recruitment and finances) and 48 (Al-Shabaab relations with AQAP and the Houthis).
https://docs.un.org/en/S/2026/651

9. Reuters, “Ethiopian troops enter town on border with Eritrea, stoking war fears”, 13 October 2026.
https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ethiopian-troops-enter-town-border-with-eritrea-stoking-war-fears-2026-10-13/

10. AUSSOM, “ENDF Troops Complete Longest AUSSOM Tour of Duty in Somalia”, 7 September 2026.
https://au-ssom.org/endf-troops-complete-longest-aussom-tour-of-duty-in-somalia/

11. African Union Peace and Security Council, communiqué of its 1330th meeting, 12 February 2026, paragraph 14 (additional Ethiopian and Ugandan bilateral deployments).
https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/communique-of-the-1330th-meeting-of-the-psc-held-at-ministerial-level-on-12-february-2026-on-consideration-of-the-situation-in-somalia-and-operations-of-the-au-support-and-stabilization-mission-in-somalia-aussom

12. Jay Bahadur, An Iranian Fingerprint? Tracing Type 56-1 Assault Rifles in Somalia, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, November 2021.
https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/iran-firearms-somalia/