For decades, governments around the world have spent billions of dollars fighting terrorist organizations. They have used fighter jets, special forces, intelligence operations, and advanced weapons. Some groups have been weakened or destroyed, while others have managed to rebuild themselves and return years later. This raises an important question; what actually makes a counterterrorism campaign successful?

A large body of research on this question points to a clear answer. Military force is necessary, but it is not enough on its own. Lasting success comes when military power is combined with ideological efforts, intelligence, effective governance, and public trust.

A well-known study by the RAND Corporation examined 648 terrorist organizations that existed between 1968 and 2006. The study found that 268 of those organizations had ended during that period. What is particularly interesting is how they ended. Among those 268 groups, only 7 percent were defeated through military force alone. Around 40 percent were brought to an end through police and intelligence operations, while 43 percent ended after entering political processes. The remaining 10 percent ended after achieving victory. These figures suggest that military force has historically been an important part of counterterrorism, but it is rarely the only factor that brings a terrorist organization to an end (Jones & Libicki, 2008).

The reason is simple. Military operations can destroy bases, weapons, and leadership structures. They do not automatically eliminate the ideas that keep an organization alive. Groups such as al-Shabaab and ISIS do not survive through weapons alone. They survive through their ability to recruit new members, spread propaganda, create fear, and in some cases gain or force a degree of acceptance within communities. If these factors are left untouched, an organization can rebuild even after losing large amounts of territory and military strength.

This is why security experts often point to two important dimensions of the fight. One is the military campaign, which targets the visible and physical capabilities of an organization. The other is the ideological fight, which targets the narrative, propaganda, and ideas used by the organization. The strongest results come when the two work together.

One of the clearest examples is Colombia. The Colombian government fought the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, for more than five decades. During the earlier years, the government relied heavily on large-scale military operations. Although many senior commanders were killed or captured, FARC continued to operate. The conflict persisted because the organization maintained networks of support in some communities and continued to recruit new members.

Over time, however, Colombia changed its approach. Alongside military and intelligence operations, the government expanded efforts to encourage fighters to leave the organization, counter its propaganda, and extend state institutions into areas where FARC had exercised significant influence. These efforts, combined with military pressure, political negotiations, and demobilization programs, contributed to the peace agreement reached in 2016. The Colombian case shows that military pressure becomes more effective when it is combined with political, social, and institutional measures. 

Another example is the fight against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. In 2014, ISIS controlled an enormous area of territory, estimated at around 88,000 square kilometers, with millions of people living under its control. The international response was not limited to airstrikes. It also included efforts to counter ISIS propaganda, work with religious and community leaders, and restore public confidence in areas recovered from the group. By 2019, ISIS had lost the territory it once controlled. However, the organization itself did not disappear. Its ability to operate as a territorial power was largely broken, but its ideology and underground networks remained. This is an important reminder that military victory over territory does not automatically mean the end of an extremist group or its ideology.

Indonesia offers another important lesson. Following the 2002 Bali bombings, the Indonesian government strengthened specialized police and intelligence units to target Jemaah Islamiyah. But the response did not stop there. The government also introduced rehabilitation and reintegration programs, worked with respected religious scholars to challenge extremist interpretations, and engaged communities in efforts to reduce recruitment. Over time, the group’s operational capacity and ability to carry out major attacks declined significantly.

These global precedents provide a crucial framework for evaluating one of today’s most resilient insurgencies, al-Shabaab. When applying these lessons to Somalia, an important question emerges. If military power alone is not enough, what is required to bring al-Shabaab to an end?

The answer begins with understanding that al-Shabaab is not simply an armed force operating in rural areas. It is a complex organization with a senior leadership structure, an armed wing, intelligence networks, a financial system built partly around taxation and extortion, forms of administration and justice in areas where it has influence, and a propaganda system used to recruit members, intimidate communities, and justify its ideology and actions. Because of this structure, attacking only one part of the organization gives the other parts an opportunity to keep it alive.

For example, if military forces remove al-Shabaab from an area but the government fails to establish functioning administration, security, justice, and basic services, a vacuum emerges. The group can then exploit local grievances and weaknesses. If a senior leader is killed while recruitment networks and propaganda operations remain intact, another leader emerges. If the group’s finances are disrupted but communities remain dependent on or fearful of the organization, new sources of funding can be developed.

This means the fight against al-Shabaab should not be reduced to the question “How many fighters have been killed?” A more important question is “What allows the organization to produce the fighter of tomorrow?”

This is where the ideological fight becomes important though it must be acknowledged that the challenge extends beyond countering rhetoric. The extremist narrative is often inadvertently strengthened by the conduct of the Federal Government of Somalia and Federal Member States. When the federal structure exhibits dysfunction or fails to deliver basic administration and justice, it validates the grievances the insurgency exploits. Therefore, the goal should be to model accountable governance while challenging the narrative used to recruit young people, expose the gap between what the organization claims and what it actually does, strengthen the voices of religious scholars and community leaders who reject violent extremism, and create alternative paths through which young people can find education, employment, dignity, and a future.

People who have previously been members of al-Shabaab can also provide important insight into how the organization operates and why some members eventually leave. Someone who has been inside the organization may understand its structure, recruitment methods, internal dynamics, and weaknesses. However, leaving an organization and abandoning extremist beliefs are not necessarily the same thing.

Some former members, including individuals who have since become part of Somalia’s federal political system, have moved from the armed group into formal political and government structures. Their departure from Al-Shabaab should not automatically be interpreted as a complete rejection of the ideology associated with the organization. This highlights an important distinction: leaving an organization is not necessarily the same as completely abandoning the ideology associated with it. For this reason, the merits of defection of persons who leave al-Shabaab need to be understood and assessed individually, including the reasons they left and the extent to which they have moved away from extremist beliefs. To operationalize this effectively, defectors should be evaluated through structured psychological and ideological vetting before entering reintegration pipelines. Establishing formalized institutional frameworks to evaluate their motivations, rather than relying solely on ad-hoc political accommodations, ensures a more sustainable security transition. This is important both for countering extremist narratives and for reducing the risk of former members or new recruits returning to violence.

If the goal is to permanently weaken and ultimately end al-Shabaab, success cannot be measured by territorial gains alone. The organization must lose its ability to fight, finance its operations, recruit new members, intimidate communities, and persuade Somalis that its ideology offers a legitimate path.

Military force targets the organization’s ability to fight. Intelligence operations disrupt its networks. Effective governance fills the space in which the organization operates. Economic measures weaken its ability to finance itself. The ideological fight challenges the narrative and recruitment systems that allow it to reproduce itself.

Therefore, if Somalia wants to bring al-Shabaab to an end, the question should not be whether military force or ideological efforts are more important. The real question is how the two can be integrated into a broader strategy that weakens the organization’s current capabilities while preventing it from rebuilding in the future. History and research point to the same broader lesson: military force can defeat the fighter of today, but effective governance, public trust, and credible alternatives can help prevent the fighter of tomorrow.

Somalia needs to combine military power, intelligence, ideological efforts, effective governance, and public support. Military operations can weaken the organization’s ability to operate on the battlefield, while intelligence can dismantle its networks. On the other hand, a parallel track that prioritises good governance and credible alternatives can reduce its ability to recruit, raise funds, and gain influence. Real success, therefore, is not simply defeating Al-Shabaab today. It is preventing the organization from rebuilding tomorrow.

Jones, S. G., & Libicki, M. C. (2008). How terrorist groups end: Lessons for countering al Qa’ida. RAND Corporation.