Recent political developments on the future of Galmudug raise difficult questions about the direction of Somalia’s federal project. At a time when there is an intense debate on elections, constitutional amendments, and the balance of power between the federal government and the federal member states, Galmudug has become another test of whether political transitions will be shaped by transparent and competitive democracy or by closed-door elite bargaining. This is important because Galmudug is not simply another arena of routine political competition. It is one of Somalia’s most fragile but strategically important federal member state, where state-building, reconciliation, and security deeply intertwine. 

A week ago, local reports indicated that President Ahmed Abdi Kariye “Qoorqoor” has withdrawn from the re-election race of Galmudug state elections after a period of intense consultations involving senior figures linked to the federal government and the National Intelligence and Security Agency. While some local pundits have lauded this as a “peaceful, consensus-driven transition,” others call this a highly cynical “political buyout” which treated Galmudug state as a “commodity” to be sold to the highest bidder. “It’s obvious that to smooth the path for Mogadishu’s handpicked guy, a ‘golden handshake” was engineered, carving up ambassadorial posts, federal positions, land allocations, and financial cushions to absorb the incumbent and key political aspirants into an exclusive elite bargain.” One anonymous source claimed.

This claim should be treated with care, but such perceptions can’t be underestimated, especially in a federal member state whose political order rests on a negotiated settlement. Of course, Galmudug’s formation was shaped by federal government involvement, but research on Galmudug’s evolution shows its internal survival has depended on delicate accommodation among multiple clans and sub-clans, as well as repeated reconciliation efforts. Therefore, when leadership transitions appear to be driven primarily by outside “deal-making” or narrow political alignment, it risks upsetting those balances and weakening the legitimacy of the institutions that hold the state fabric together.

The problem, therefore, is larger than the fate of one politician or one electoral cycle. The current arrangement can produce short-term smooth transition, but over time, that dynamic can deepen political cynicism, especially among younger people who are often told that Somalia is steadily recovering, yet continue to see that decisive choices that directly affect them is made behind closed doors and without their consultation and consideration. In a context where the Somali state is still competing with armed movements and competing clan narratives, such erosion of trust is not a minor cost.

The Galmudug matter also has enormous significance for security. Galmudug sits at the center of Somalia’s struggle to extend governance into Al-shabab controlled areas and prevent armed insurgency from exploiting political fractures. Political commentators in the region warn that poorly handled elections, renewed clan grievances, and weak institutional legitimacy can aggravate instability. Where political settlements fail to command broad confidence, security actors are pulled into elite competition, administrative attention drifts away from service delivery into looting behaviour and local disputes become incentivised for violent actors to manipulate. In such an environment, even a transition that looks calm on the surface may carry deeper risks beneath it.

For that reason, the key issue is not whether elites should negotiate or not; in Somalia, elite negotiation is unavoidable. The issue is whether those negotiations will be bounded by rules that protect public institutions from becoming extensions of temporary political coalitions that take people’s silence as compliance. Therefore, traditional elders, civil society, and Somalia’s international partners should press for clearer protections for public accountability and administrative continuity, more transparent transition arrangements, and a stronger distinction between political office and the professional civil service. If Galmudug’s future is decided through opaque bargains alone, the state may preserve a glimpse of order while losing the legitimacy and institutional resilience it needs to endure.

Galmudug does not need a perfect transition. It needs a credible one. Without that, Somalia risks repeating a familiar pattern in which each political settlement postpones instability rather than resolving it. That is the real test its facing now.